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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
RANDY RIVAS, by JOE RIVAS, his
Guardian ad Litem,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.
PACIFIC FINANCE COMPANY, a
corporation,

Case No.
10,155

Defendant-Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

NATURE OF 'THE CASE
This is an action for personal injuries sustained by
the minor plaintiff when struck by defendant's automobile as he was riding a sled on a Salt Lake 'County
street.

DIS.POSITION IN LOWER ·COURT
The case was tried before a jury, which returned
a verdict for defendant, and after denial of his Motion
for New Trial, plaintiff appealed.
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PRELIMINARY STA·TEMENT
·The parties will be designated as they appeared in
the trial court. All references to the record refer to the
pages numbered in red and the typed page numbers in
the transcript of testimony are ignored.
The statement of facts in plaintiff's brief is not
accepted by the defendant and should not be favorably
considered by this court, in view of the rule reiterated
in Reynolds v. W. W. Clyde & Co., (1956), 5 Utah 2d 151,
298 P.2d 531 :
"Plaintiff presents her case on appeal by
reciting facts tending most favorably to prove
her claim. The opposite approach must be adopted, and it hardly bears repeating that in a case
like this the factual situation will be reviewed on
appeal in the light most favorable to the party
prevailing below."
Defendant presents, in the following Statement of
Facts, the evidence the jury reasonably could have believed and the inferences which the jury could have
fairly drawn therefrmn, in arriving at its verdict. In Re.
Richards Estate, (1956) 5 Utah 2d 106, 297 P.2d 542.
STATEl\fEN·T OF FACTS
This accident occurred on a snow-covered street
in a residential area of southwest Salt Lake County (R.
69). At the tilne of the accident the plaintiff. then age 5
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years 8 months, was on his stomach on a sled in the
westbound lane of traffic, in which lane defendant's
car was traveling (R. 73). His position was such that
he could not be seen by an automobile driver approaching from the east until at a point 50 to 75 feet from
the ultimate point of impact (R. 80), because the boy on
the sled was in a "blind spot" caused by a canal running under the road and creating a hump in the road
east of the point of impact. A driver coming from the
east and toward the point of impact was required to
go up the eastern side of the hu1np, cross its ~op and
then come down the west side (R. 80). The nature and
extent of the hump, the grades before and after it and
the effect upon a westbound driver's vision are all
illustrated by the photographs that were placed in evidence (Exhibits 4, 5, 6).
1

The investigating deputy sheriff testified that he
got in his automobile, during the investigation, and attempted to retrace the route of the automoble that
struck the plaintiff. As he did so, he noted the blind
spot and tes1tified that a driver of a car coming from
the east probably could not have seen the point of
impact, and thus the child lying on his stomach on the
sled in the ,yestbound lane of travel, until the car was
"right on top of the rise" or about 50 to 75 feet away
(R. 80, 82, 139).
\Yhile the road was snow covered, it was much more
slick than it appeared. The investigating officer said
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it was very slick unde-rfoot but "we didn't realize how
slick it was until we started walking" (R. 78). It was
"hard to stand up" (R. 7'5). The road was so slick that
after the impact it was difficult for the defendant driver
and a witness to push and back the automobile away
from the child who was then lodged under its front end
(R. 96).
The defendant's driver testified he was traveling
at about 15 ~to 20 miles per hour, observed some children
about a block or a block and one-half away on his left
but saw nothing else on the road (R. 131, 132). He was
not aware of the extent of the blind spot, since his
only previous travel on the road had been in the opposite direction about 15 ~to 20 minutes earlier. On his
return trip, going west, he drove up the east side of
the hump and as he reached its top, and started across
it and down the other side, he saw the child, attired in
a bright red coat, lying on the sled in front of the car,
in the west-bound lane of traffic. He immediately jammed on his brakes. The boy got up on his hands and
tried to move toward the driver's left, so the driver
swerved to his right, but "there was no time left" and
"the car was on him" ( R. 133, 134).
'The driver testified that while it now n1ight have
been better to turn the other way, he reactc>d instantaneously, by reflex, and without time for reflection because
of the emergency. As he put it. '" .... I did the best I
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could. It may not have been the best, but it was the best
I could do at the time" (R. 190).
A witness called by Plaintiff, Mrs. Janice Wilkerson, testified she had been driving east on the road, at
a point some distance west of the impact, and saw the
child lying face down on his sled in the roadway (R.
95). Her testimony and the investigation of the investigating officer established the fact the defendant's driver
was not traveling at an excessive speed.
The plaintiff resided at a point a block east of the
scene of the accident, and although his mother was h01ne
she did not know he was out in the street. Because of
the hump in the road she could not see the street where
the boy was (R. 123). Both she and her husband had
repeatedly admonished the child about the dangers of
cars and to stay out of the roadway, and although the
rhild was a bright, intelligent youngster, he apparently
did not obey his parents. The jury verdict in favor of
the defendant was unanimous. Plaintiff's timely motion
for a new trial was argued to the court and denied.
This appeal followed.
AR.GUMENT
POINT I.
UNDER THE EVIDENCE, THE ISSUES OF DEFENDANT'S NEGLIGENCE AND PLAINTIFF'S CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE WERE CLEARLY FOR THE JURY TO DETERMINE AND THE COURT, THEREFORE, PROPERLY
DENIED PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT.
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Plaintiff's contention that a verdict should have been
directed in his favor at the close of all the evidence
ignores the basic principles which permit the invocation
of that drastic procedure and conveniently disregards
the principles which delineate the functions of judge and
jury under our judicial system.
·The tests which the evidence must meet in order to
justify the granting of a directed verdict have been
clearly and repeatedly set out by this Court in its decisions. As is stated in Finlayson v. Brady} (1952) 121 Utah
204, 240 P. 2d 491, 492, it is a fundamental rule that:
"In directing a verdict, this court has held, as
authorities generally hold, that the evidence is to
be examined in a light most favorable to the party
against whom the verdict is intended, and that it
is not the province of the court to \Yeigh or determine the preponderance of the evidence."
This fundamental principle was repeated in Boskovich
v. Utah Construction Co.J (1953) 123 Utah 387, 259 P.
2d 885, and in decisions since so frequently as to require
no further citation. And, that this rule governs not only
claims asserted by a plaintiff, but also that it "applies
with equal force to an affirn1ative defense by the defendant," as in the present case, is shown by f.."' elson r.
BramesJ (lOth Cir., 1958) 253 F. 2d 381.
If a trial court has resolved every controYerted
fact in the evidence and <"VPry inference therefrmn in a
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light most favorable to the defendant, it still may not
grant a directed verdict against a defendant unless there
is no evidence to support any of the asserted defenses.
As this .Court stated in the recent case of Charvoz v.
rottrell, (1961) 12 Utah 2d 25, 361 P. 2d 516:
"·Certainly if there is a conflict in the evidence the question of negligence is not one of
law, but one of fact to be determined by the jury.
However, even if the facts are undisputed, if fairIninded men can honestly draw different conclusion from them, the issue of negligence should be
settled by a jury. In other words, negligence is
a question for the jury unless all reasonable men
must draw the same conclusion from the facts
as they are shown."
The plaintiff here has made no attempt whatever
to bring himself within the rules outlined above. Instead of resolving every conflict in the evidence and
inference therefrom in favor of defendant, as he is required to do, he attempts to give himself the benefit
of every bit and shred of evidence and every tenuous
inference therefrmn which he is able to extract from the
record and which, even indirectly, tends to support his
contention that children may have been in the general
area fifteen or twenty minutes before the accident. From
these unsupported and largely discredited bits and
pieces of testimony 'v-hich defendant's driver, Mr. George,
directly, unequivocally and convincingly contradicted,
plaintiff draws the totally unwarranted and patently
self-serving conclusion that:
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"The only reasonable conclusion that can be
drawn from the testimony ... is that when Mr.
George was eastbound on Crystal Avenue fifteen
to twenty minutes before he struck the respondent
(sic), he had seen the child playing in the same
general area. He knew where the child was and
what he was doing. When he returned westbound
on Crystal A venue he knew that children had
been playing in the area where the accident occurred." (Emphasis added.) Plaintiff's Brief p. 6.
As this excerpt from this brief clearly shows, plaintiff seeks to have this Court cast aside applicable rules
of law and permit him to stretch the facts and inferences
therefrom beyond all reasonable limits despite a jury
verdict against him. He seeks, on the basis of indirect,
contradicted and discredited evidence in the record to
have this Court hold, as a matter of law, that defendant's
driver saw plaintiff 15 minutes prior to the accident and
thus knew both where he was and '""hat he was doing at
the time of the accident. Such a patently absurd attempt
to circumvent submission of that question to tlw jury
cannot be sustained.
Having thus attempted by n1ental sleight of hand to
impute to Mr. George actual knowledge of plaintiff's
presence in the area prior to the accident, when in fact
none existed, plaintiff next attempts to couple that supposed "knowledge" with an inaccurate and, again, slanted
version of events immediately preceding the accident to
support his even more tenuous contention that defendant's driver was negligent, as a matter of law, in failing
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to avoid the accident. liere again he attempts to rely
upon contro,~erted facts and inferences in the record
which tPnd to support his position and completely disregard and ignore the great body of evidence which clearly
rebuts any contention of negligence on the part of the
defendant. Disputed facts and questionable inferences
in the trial court do not mature into uncontradicted
proof during their journey to the Supreme Court.
Plaintiff's contentions disregard, for example, the
Pvidence that the roadway was snow packed and deceptivel~r slick in the area of the accident; that defendant's
driver was traveling at a slow and reasonable rate of
speed prior to and at the time of the accident; that plaintiff could not be seen by Mr. George until he was almost
upon him; that plaintiff's presence upon the highway
in a prone position at the point of the accident was
highly unusual and unexpected; and that the situation
facing the driver when he first became aware of the
peril was clearly an emergency to which he had to react
instantaneously.
Plaintiff also contends, as he must, that there was
no evidence of contributory negligence to submit to the
jury. In support of this contention he once again picks
out yarious portions of the evidence which tend to support his claimed freedom from fault and resolves all
factual disputes and inferences in his own favor.
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Certainly a jury question as to plaintiff's contributory negligence is presented where, as here, the plaintiff
was lying on a sled in a prone position, out of the line
of sight of west-bound vehicles, on the well-traveled but
slick county road when the accident occurred.
The jury was instructed that defendant claimed as
negligent conduct on the part of plaintiff only that he
"was riding on his stomach on his sled on the highway
along which defendant's driver was traveling and below
the point of vision of defendant's driver due to a canal
that raised the surface of the road" (R. 34). They were
also instructed that a child is not held to the same
standard of conduct as an adult but is required to exercise that degree of care which ordinarily would be used
by children of the same age, intelligence and experience
under the same or similar circumstances.
Being thus carefully limited and explained by the
trial court, the issue of plaintiff's contributory negligence
was properly submitted to the jury under the doctrine
of Mann v. Fa,irbourn, (1961) 1:2 lTtah 2d 342, 366 P.2d
603, 606, which, incidentally, also involved a 5 year
old boy:
"If the trial judge, after a consideration of
the age, experience and capacity of the child to
understand and avoid risks and dangers to which
it was exposed in the actual circumstances and
situation of the case, detennines that fair-minded
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n1en might honestly differ as to whether the children failed to exercise that degree of care that is
usually exercised by persons of similar age, expPrience and intelligence, the question of the
child's contributory negligence should be submitted to the jury .... "
It is significant, we believe, that plaintiff concludes
his attack on the refusal to direct a verdict in his favor
with the statement that the "weight of the evidence establishes that :Mr. George did have knowledge of the presence
of appellant, and that he failed to take the precautions
the law required under such circumstances." (Emphasis
added). As this statement shows, he complains that the
trial court did not weigh the evidence rather than submit
it to the jury. Neither the trial court, nor this court on
appeal, has that prerogative which, under our system,
is reserved to the jury.
POINT II.
THE COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON
ALL ISSUES RAISED BY THE EVIDENCE, INCLUDING
ALL ISSUES UPON WHICH PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED
TO RELY.

Plaintiff contends that by its Instructions No. 1 and
2 the court in effect directed a jury verdict for defendant. Specifically, plaintiff objects to that portion of Instruction K o. 1 ·which advised the jury that defendant's
only clain1 of negligence on the part of plaintiff \Yas that
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he "was riding on his stomach on a sled on the highway
along which defendant's driver was traveling and below
the point of defendant's vision due to a canal that raised
the surface of the road."
Plaintiff's objection to this explanation of the limited nature of defendant's claim of negligence on plaintiff's part is surprising in view of the fact that the court
earlier in the same introductory instruction similarly
explained plaintiff's claimed grounds of negligence
against defendant (R. 33).
Plaintiff's objection to Instruction No. 2 is directed
to that portion which requires plaintiff to prove each
and every material element of his case as well as proximate cause by a preponderance of the evidence and which
"entitles him to recover" upon doing so, unless barred
by his own contributory negligence. Plaintiff does not
mention the fact that this same instruction specifically
required that the defendant establish contributory negligence by a preponderance of the e·vidence.
There is no merit to plaintiff's contention that the
effect of Instructions No. 1 and 2 was to tell the jury
that if plaintiff was lying on the sled in the road that
fact alone constituted contributory negligence. To begin
with, the court specificall~v told the jury in Instruction
No. 1 that it was merely sununarizing "the contentions
of the parties" (R. 34). Secondly, the tenn "contributor~r
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negligence" is expressly defined in Instruction No. 3 as
a want of ordinary care on the part of an injured person
which proximately contributes to his own injury (R. 37).
Thirdly, the standard of care expected of a child is set
forth fully in Instruction No. 11 as that standard was
(\nunciated by this Court in the recent case of Mann v.
Fairbo?t.rn, supra. Thus, plaintiff wants this Court to
hold that the jury failed to consider all of the instructions and. all of the evidence and "reach such a verdict
as will do justice between the parties" as it was in~tructed to do (R. 51).
Plaintiff's objection to that portion of Instruction
No. 2 which requires for a finding of contributory negligence that the "negligence proximately contributed in
·some degree to his own injuries" likewise has no merit.
(Emphasis added). His statement that there is no distinguishable difference between the phrase "in some degree" and "in any degree," disregards the basic dictionary definition of those terms. Thus, "any" is defined in
Webster's Unabridged Dictionary as "indicating that
which is considered, despite very great or slight quantity
or extent" or "one part or individual without regard to
which or how great or small." The word "some" on the
other hand is defined as "that is of an unspecified but
appreciable or not inconsiderable quantity, amount, degree, etc.; more than a little; that are in number at least,
or more than a few." None of the words or phrases used
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by Webster's in defining "some," indicate a slight or
insignificant quantity or amount as is the case ·with
"any" as noted above.
This difference in meaning between the terms
"some" and "any" easily answers the contention made
by plaintiff that he was prejudiced by the use of the
word "some" in Instruction No. 2. The distinction has
been repeatedly recognized by the decisions of this Court
and others, where it has been said that "some" is neither
the equivalent of "any" as used in Taylor v. Johnson,
(1964) 393 P. 2d 384, Case No. 9874; Johnson v. Le1cis,
(19'52) 121 Utah 218, 240 P. 2d 498; Devine v. Cook,
(1955) 3 Utah 2d 134, 279 P. 2d 1073; Ferguson v.
Jongsma, (1960) 10 Utah 2d 179, 350 P. 2d 404; and
Annotation 87 A.L.R. 2d 1448-49, nor the equivalent
of "however slight" used in Devine v. Cook, s·upra;
Johnson v. Lewis, supra,; Wilson v. City & County of
San Francisco, (Calif., 1959) 3-1-± P. 2d 828, cited in
plaintiff's brief.
Even had the tenn "any" been used instead of
"some," however, it is clear that under the facts presented no prejudice could have resulted to plaintiff since if
he were found by the jury to have been contributorily
negligent, there can be no doubt but that such negligence
necessarily would have been a substantial contributing
cause of his injuries in this case. The total effect of the
court's instructions, moreover, contrary· to what plaintiff now claims, was to present, fully and fairly, all
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clai1ns asserted by plaintiff as well as the defenses asserted by defendant and, on the whole, there can be no
doubt but that plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity
to prrsent his case to the jury. And, although the use
of the term "any" in the instructions would have been
improper, such an error, on balance, would not have
been prejudicial to the extent to require a reversal under
all the facts.
The case of Mack v. Precast lndustries, Inc., (Mich.,
1963) 120 N. W. 2d 225, as the excerpt therefrom at pp.
11-12 of plaintiff's brief clearly shows, has no application whatever to the present case. In that case the trial
court erred in holding the plaintiff to a higher standard
of care than that which he required of the defendant.
Instruction No. 4, to which plaintiff takes exception,
is patterned closely after Jury Instruction Forms, Utah,
Form No. 16.6. Although it would have been proper for
the court to have been used instead plaintiff's requested
Instruction No. 7, that instruction adds very little to
the principle of the instruction actually given and would
not materially aid the jury in resolving the issues of
negligence. Rather, by referring to a specific statute
it might have tended to confuse them.
The trial court of necessity must be given some
leeway in selecting his instructions for the jury and
cannot be required to accept every variation on a stand-
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ard instruction such as this one which counsel can con' is straining at' a gnat in seriously sugjure up. Plaintiff
gesting that this instruction was prejudicial to him.
Plaintiff complains of that portion of Instruction
No. 8 which advised the jury that
" . . . extrordinary care was not required, and
that while exceptional caution and skill are to be
admired and encouraged the law does not demand
them as a standard of conduct."
The challenged language is taken almost verbatim from
J.I.F.U., Form No. 15-2, and while that fact does not
insure its propriety, the instruction has received widespread use and is generally utilized in such cases by our
trial courts. The portion of Instruction K o. 8 relating to
judging the driver's conduct by the then existing circumstances and not by hindsight, and Instruction No. 9,
relating to proper lookout, are but simple state1nents of
basic law. It is sub1nitted that plaintiff's objection to
t h<'RP instructions de1nonstrates the inherent weakness of
hiR appeal.
PiuintiffR r<'quested Instruction No. 7, as noted
nhov<', add~ nothing whatPYPr to the court's Instruction
No.7 relatin' to the grounds upon "~I1icl1 defendant could
h<' fonnd JH'gligent. In fad, a careful analysis of In:·d rudion No. 7, as giY<'H hy the court, clear]~~ shows that
it wn~ h<'nvil~· W{~ig-hted in plaintiff's favor. It told the
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jury, for example, that defendant's driver had to "keep
a proper lookout for Randy Rivas" "and to exercise
reasonable care to anticipate the presence of said child,"
even though the evidence was wholly contradictory and
largely discredited as to whether Mr. George knew or
should have known that plaintiff was even in the general area.
Instruction No. 12, to which objection is made, is
again taken from J.I.F.U., Form No. 16.1. While an
instruction on unavoidable accident should not be given
in every case, the doctrine is, nevertheless, particularly
applicable where, as here, a reasonable person might
conclude that neither party was negligent in that the
roads were snow-packed and unexpectedly slick, the
plaintiff was not visible until the vehicle was almost
upon him, the plaintiff was in a prone position and at
a point where he would not normally be expected and
defendant's driver did what he could in the emergency
to avoid the accident.
None of the cases cited by plaintiff on the unavoidable accident issue apply in the present case: The case
of Rodoni v. llaskin, (Mont., 1960) 355 P. 2d 296, referred to in plaintiff's brief, involved a dP.fendant who
admitted knowing that the roads were slick and that he
had failed to slow for a chuckhole with which he was
familiar and which he knew "could throw" his car if he
hit it, notwithstanding he had seen plaintiff's car approaching. The chuckhole threw his car into the opposite
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lane of travel and it collided head-on with plaintiff's car.
This case does not support plaintiff under the present
facts. Rather, the court there stated that the unavoidable
accident instruction was helpful to a jury and should be
used in appropriate cases.
In the case of K reh v. Trinkle, (Kan., 1959) 343 P.
2d 213, upon which plaintiff also relies, the defendant
admitted that he did not see the other vehicle into which
he collided at an intersection until just before impact
although there was nothing which kept him from doing
so. 'The court there held that an unavoidable accident
instruction would be "peculiary appropriate" where
"from the evidence the jury could reasonably conclude
that there was neither negligence nor contributory negligence." Such is the state of the evidence in the present
case.
In Wellman v. Noble, (1961) 12 Utah 2d 350, 366
P. 2d 701, this Court, as plaintiff notes, held that such
an instruction is proper in an appropriate case. In
Porter v. Price, (1960) 11 Utah 2d 80, 355P. 2d 66, 68,
to which the Wellman case refers, this Court noted, in
harmony with the J( rPh case, supra, that:
" . . . there are some situations where the
evidence is susceptible of being so interpreted
that an accident occurred without negligence on
the part of anyone, and if it is reasonably susceptibl~ of such. interpretation, and a party requests 1t, the tnal court commits no error in so
advising the jury."
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( ~h•nrly, this statements cover the situation presented
h~· t itP PvidencP in the present case.
Plaintiff's objection to Instruction No. 13, covering
tlw law applicable to a driver confronted with an emergt>ney, iH patently absurd. Again he seeks to impute to
defendant's driver, as a matter of law, actual knowledge
ot' plaintiff's presence and position, although the evidence
iH in conflict and wholly unsatisfactory on the point.
Kn•n asstnning he had previously seen the child in the
gt•neral area, however, and plaintiff is not entitled to
<'laim in this Court that he did, that would be no basis
upon which to predicate his fault, as a matter of law,
in failing to anticipate that the boy would be in a prone
position on the roadway and out of his vision until he
was right upon him. The mere statement of that position reveals its transparency. Defendant's driver did not
and could not reasonably have been expected to see or
antieipate plaintiff's danger until he came into his view.
ender those circumstances he was faced with the clearest
kind of an emergency. Plaintiff's objection to that instruction is but a further twist of the facts to gain an
advantage to which he is clearly not entitled under the
law.
The basic purpose underlying plaintiff's wholly un~npportable fly -speck assault upon the claimed total
effect of the Court's instructions, is to bring himself
within the rule of Taylor v. Johnson, S1.tpra, with the
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claim that the instructions so emphasized defense theories
they prejudiced the jury against plaintiff and deprived
him of a fair trial. A eomparison of that case with the
present one, however, readily demonstrates their dissimilarity and the propriety of the instructions given in
this case.
At the outset it will be noted that the factual situations presented by these two cases are entirely dissimilar. In Taylor, moreover, 47 instructions were given,
compared to 17 here.
In Taylor the "instructions contained no direct concise statement of the main determinative issues of fact
in the case," such as are set forth in Instructions No. 1,
2 and 7 here.
In Taylor at least ten different instructions "ended
with a long, repetitious statement that such a finding
required a verdict for the defendant" and three other
instructions recited the same conclusions, whereas only
Instruction No. 8 ended with that language here. Moreover, in Taylor, "such statements ·w-ere ... emphasized
with repetitious and capital letters."
In Taylor at least three instructions were "based on
an entirely different factual situation" which "had no
application" to that case "and tended to mislead the
jury." No such situation exists here.
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In Tay/01·, also, "many other instructions" were
givPn on tlw <lPfPnsP of contributory negligence and "emphn::-;it.Pd faet situations which were not supported by the
Pvi<lPIH'P." No ~meh abuse is found in this record.
In short, plaintiff has shown no real prejudice here.
His complaints are such as could be directed with equal
for<'P ag-ainst almost any set of jury instructions which
might be given in this type of case.
Plaintiff's final contention that he was prejudiced
hy tlw court's refusal to grant his requested Instructions
No. 3, 5, 7 and 11 is also wholly without justification.
I I is request No. 3 which would require defendant's
driver "to be aware of ... persons" on the street incorrPctly states the duty required of him, since the law does
not require that he be aware of a person's presence on

the street until he sees, or in the exercise of reasonable
eare he should see, the person. Even so, however, the
Court's Instruction No. 7, which required Mr. George
•·to keep a proper lookout for Randy Rivas ... and to
f'xercise reasonable care to anticipate the presence of
said child," in effect, imposes the srune heavy duty
sought to be imposed by plaintiff's request No. 3. The
balance of request No. 3, relating to the duty to use
reasonable care, was fully covered in Instructions No.
:1. 7 and 10.
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The contention that the failure to give plaintiff's
requests No. 5 and 7 constitutes reversible error has
already been discussed above.
Plaintiff's request No. 7, relating to the degree of
care required toward children, assumes that the person
charged with negligence was aware not only that
a specific person is subject to foreseeable risk of
harm but also that such person is a child and, hence,
even more likely than an adult to be harmed due to his
youthful propensities. In the present case, the driver
was totally unaware of the presence of plaintiff in the
area of the accident until he came into view. The fact
that he was a child rather than an adult could have had
no effect whatever upon Mr. George's reaction when he
became aware of his peril. Request No. 3, therefore,
has no proper application to the present facts and it
was properly denied.
CONCLUSION
No claim of prejudice or impropriety has been made
as to the court's conduct of the trial itself. The court's
instructions are the target of plaintiff's attack.
'There is an abundance of support in the record and
in applicable law to uphold the instructions given by the
court as well as the jury verdict in this case. As has
been noted, plaintiff has cited neither authority nor
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t~vidPtl<'P

which demands a different conclusion. Although
t hPn' was PvidPIH'<' from which the jury could have
found in plaintiff's favor under the instructions given,
t lw ,!..!,T(•at \n•ight of the evidence, and the jury's verdict,
wPrP in favor of dPfPndant.
Plaintiff had his day in court and the issues were
found gain~t him. He had his case fairly and fully presPntPd to the jury. His many allegations of error are
:-;upporh•d neither in the record nor by the authorities.
rrhe words of ,Justice Crockett in Hales v. Peterson,
(l Dlil) 11 Utah 2d -t-11, 360 P. 2d 822, 825-25 are particnlarl~· appropriate here:
'' \V e have heretofore recognized the importance of safeguarding the right of trial by jury.
A necessary corollary to it is that there must be
some solidarity in the result so that it can be
rPlied upon. To the extent the verdict can easily
he sC't aside by the court, the right to trial by jury
is ''~·eakened. In order to give substance to the
right, once the trial has been had and a verdict
rendered, it should not be regarded lightly, nor
oyerturned because of errors or irregularities unless they are of sufficient consequence to have
afferted the result.
··~\nyone acquainted with the practical operation of a trial by jury and the human factors that
1nust play a part therein is aware that it would
be aln1ost impossible to complete a trial of any
length without some things occurring with which
rounsPl. after the case is lost, can find fault and,
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in zeal for his cause, all quite in good faith, magnify into error which to him and the losing parties
seems blameable for their failure to prevail. However, from the standpoint of administering evenhanded justice the ·Court must dispassionately
survey such claims against the over-all picture
of the trial, and if the parties have been afforded
an opportunity to fully and fairly present their
evidence and arguments upon the issues, a~d the
jury has made its determination thereon, the objective of the proceeding has been accomplished.
And the judgment should not be disturbed unless
it is shown that there is error which is substantial
and prejudicial in the sense that it appears there
is a reasonable likelihood that the result would
have been different in the absence of such error

"
This appeal is without merit. The judgment should
be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

JOHN H. SNOW
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent

701 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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